Akin to the mathematical recreations, John Wilkins' Mathematicall Magick (1648) elaborates the pleasant, useful and wondrous part of practical mathematics, dealing in particular with its material culture of machines and instruments. We contextualize the Mathematicall Magick by studying its institutional setting and its place within changing conceptions of art, nature, religion and mathematics. We devote special attention to the way Wilkins inscribes mechanical innovations within a discourse of wonder. Instead of treating ‘wonder’ as a monolithic category, we present a (...) typology, showing that wonders were not only recreative, but were meant to inspire Wilkins' readers to new mathematical inventions. (shrink)

We often assume that religious beliefs are no different in kind from ordinary factual beliefs—that believing in the existence of God or of supernatural entities that hear our prayers is akin to believing that May comes before June. Neil Van Leeuwen shows that, in fact, these two forms of belief are strikingly different. Our brains do not process religious beliefs like they do beliefs concerning mundane reality; instead, empirical findings show that religious beliefs function like the imaginings that guide (...) make-believe play. -/- Van Leeuwen argues that religious belief—which he terms religious “credence”—is best understood as a form of imagination that people use to define the identity of their group and express the values they hold sacred. When a person pretends, they navigate the world by consulting two maps: the first represents mundane reality, and the second superimposes the features of the imagined world atop the first. Drawing on psychological, linguistic, and anthropological evidence, Van Leeuwen posits that religious communities operate in much the same way, consulting a factual-belief map that represents ordinary objects and events and a religious-credence map that accords these objects and events imagined sacred and supernatural significance. -/- It is hardly controversial to suggest that religion has a social function, but Religion as Make-Believe breaks new ground by theorizing the underlying cognitive mechanisms. Once we recognize that our minds process factual and religious beliefs in fundamentally different ways, we can gain deeper understanding of the complex individual and group psychology of religious faith. [Abstract writing credit: book editor Andrew Kinney, HUP]. (shrink)

A limited-liability corporation is an artificial (“legal”) person whose liability is limited to the assets “owned” by the corporation. This means that the real or natural persons (if there are any) who own the corporation are not liable for the consequences of corporate actions or events originating within the property “owned” by the corporation. Thus, while the limited-liability corporation itself is fully liable (i.e., to the full extent of its assets) for such actions and occurrences, its human owners (if there (...) are any) are not liable at all. Admittedly, they run a risk of losing all that they have invested in the corporation, but nothing more. This risk may be called an economic liability but it is not a liability in the relevant juridical sense: debtors cannot turn to the owners of the corporation to ask or compel them to pay its debts—it does not matter whether these debts are consequences of the corporation’s contractual obligations (wages, rents, purchases, loans, etc.) or consequences of harmful actions or events (explosions, flooding, contaminations, etc.) caused by the corporation or its property to third parties. Thus, we have the problem of the standing of the limited-liability corporation in view of the principles of Austro-libertarianism: the limited-liability corporation is a fully liable artificial person that shields any natural persons who are its owners from any liability. This is a problem because we cannot have it both ways. Either the limited-liability corporation is an autonomous (“self-owning”) person in its own right and then no objection can be made to it, as, despite its name, it is fully liable; or it is something owned by natural persons and then these owners must, like all other owners, be held fully liable for what they do (or command or permit others to do) with their property as well as for the consequences of events that originate within their property. Now, from an Austro-libertarian point of view—which, as I understand it, is committed to a realist philosophy and therefore akin to a natural law position1—it does not make sense to say that an artificial person can be an autonomous person in its own right.. (shrink)

An important aspect of any constitutional theory is the state's power to punish transgressions of the law, or the ius gladii. Although Grotius never formulated a complete, comprehensive constitutional theory, traces of such a theory can be found in many of his writings not explicitly devoted to constitutional law. Punishment even plays an important role in his books on war , since to punish transgressions of the law is ranked among the just causes of war.Given the fact that a state (...) may punish transgressions of the law – transgressions by individuals within and even outside the state, but also transgressions of the law by other states – the question may arise concerning the origin of such a right to punish. It will be shown that Grotius did not give the same answer to this question in his various works. As the right to punish is concerned, we find a theory that seems to be akin to the one of John Locke in the De iure praedae , one akin to the theories of the Spanish late-scholastics in De satisfactione and De imperio , and a theory coming close to what Thomas Hobbes had said on the ruler's right to punish in the De iure belli ac pacis .Of course, Grotius can only have been familiar with the theory of the Spanish late-scholastics, since those of Locke and Hobbes were still to be written by the time Grotius had passed away. (shrink)

The objective of the new series, "Molecular Biology, Biochemistry and Biophysics", of which this brochure forms the first volume, is to produce more than another compilation of data. It is hoped that the new series will help the individual "specialist" keep abreast of important developments in the natural sciences at the molecular and subcellular level in fields complementary to his own. The predominant aim is not so much to increase the ever-growing body of information in an encyclopedic fashion but rather (...) to give, in addition to a well rounded factual presentation of subjects which have reached a degree of maturation, a leitmotiv developed by the individual authors from a more personal point of view. The reader should thus be able to use these mono graphs not only for acquisition of knowledge but as a source of further motiva tion in his own work. This latter and more consequential aim of the monograph series is one of the reasons for presenting here a most unusual talk which should enable the reader to sit back and view his own efforts in the context of science and creative attempts as a whole. The lecture is the virtually unknown inaugural address of the Dutch physical chemist JACOBUS HENRICUS VAN'T HOFF. As is shown in his short biography presented on pages 3 and 4 the principal thoughts of the molecular biologist of today are akin to his own and he clearly recognized the universality of molecular life processes. (shrink)

In this paper a tentative neurophysiologically framed approach of the Freudian unconscious that would function on the basis of linguistic (phonological) organizing principles, is proposed. A series of arguments, coming from different fields, are taken together. First, clinical reports indicate that in a state of high emotional arousal linguistic fragments are treated in a decontextualized way, and can lead to the isolation of phoneme sequences which, independently of their actual meaning, are able to resort emotional effects. Second, phonological and neurophysiological (...) arguments are given to make the case that language processing – be it producing, receiving or imagining language – is a motor event. A crucial distinction is proposed: while contextualized processing correlates on a neurophysiological level with action understanding, and is psychoanalytically akin to secondary processing, decontextualized language processing has a neurophysiological counterpart in object understanding and is psychoanalytically akin to primary processing. Third, isolated speech fragments are therefore considered as objects which, similarly to non-linguistic objects, undergo emotional conditioning and establish an idiosyncratic linguistically structured emotional memory. Phoneme sequences which in this way come to carry high emotional valences are thought to be more readily subject to threaten the bodily integrity, and therefore more readily inhibited. When this inhibition leads to the prevention of effective realization of the voluntary motor output, this is thought to result in the sustained high levels of neuronal activation which seek for release by attracting substitutes that are phonemically similar to the censored speech fragments though they are cognitively non threatening. As a result, the speech of the subject would be particularly concerned with the verbalizations of these substitutive phoneme sequences. In summary, the Freudian unconscious is conceived as the instantiation of a linguistic action space which would be idiosyncratically organized by particular phonemic “phantoms” operating as attractors for the subject’s (linguistic) actions. (shrink)

Cian Dorr has argued that non-cognitivists must think of reasoning from moral premises to empirical conclusions as akin to wishful thinking. Defenders of non-cognitivism have responded that an adequate solution to the Frege-Geach problem would explain relations of entailment and implication between moral and nonmoral claims and thereby also handle Dorr’s objection. This paper offers a new, more specific, interpretation of Dorr’s objection and one that makes it distinct from worries about Frege-Geach. The paper also explains why non-cognitivists might (...) still reasonably be optimistic that they can allay this version of the worry. Still, successfully undercutting the worry also undercuts one of the prime reasons offered on behalf of non-cognitivism—arguments based on the Humean Theory of Motivation purporting to show that moral judgments cannot be beliefs. (shrink)

This paper describes two concepts of virtue ethics. The first is tied to modern moral theory in that it is concerned to present a new way of deciding which actions are right and wrong. It depends on a conception of moral realism which sees the rightness of an action as an objective feature of it and on metaphysics of subjectivity that sees the self as a rational and self-aware deliberator. The second, contrasting conception of virtue ethics derives from Aristotle and (...) focuses on the character of the agent. It relies on an expression theory of action and on a concept of normativity which is more akin to standards of honor and appropriateness than to the standard of moral rightness. (shrink)

An important aspect of any constitutional theory is the state's power to punish transgressions of the law, or the ius gladii. Although Grotius never formulated a complete, comprehensive constitutional theory, traces of such a theory can be found in many of his writings not explicitly devoted to constitutional law. Punishment even plays an important role in his books on war, since to punish transgressions of the law is ranked among the just causes of war.Given the fact that a state may (...) punish transgressions of the law – transgressions by individuals within and even outside the state, but also transgressions of the law by other states – the question may arise concerning the origin of such a right to punish. It will be shown that Grotius did not give the same answer to this question in his various works. As the right to punish is concerned, we find a theory that seems to be akin to the one of John Locke in the De iure praedae, one akin to the theories of the Spanish late-scholastics in De satisfactione and De imperio, and a theory coming close to what Thomas Hobbes had said on the ruler's right to punish in the De iure belli ac pacis.Of course, Grotius can only have been familiar with the theory of the Spanish late-scholastics, since those of Locke and Hobbes were still to be written by the time Grotius had passed away. (shrink)

An important aspect of any constitutional theory is the state's power to punish transgressions of the law, or the ius gladii. Although Grotius never formulated a complete, comprehensive constitutional theory, traces of such a theory can be found in many of his writings not explicitly devoted to constitutional law. Punishment even plays an important role in his books on war, since to punish transgressions of the law is ranked among the just causes of war.Given the fact that a state may (...) punish transgressions of the law – transgressions by individuals within and even outside the state, but also transgressions of the law by other states – the question may arise concerning the origin of such a right to punish. It will be shown that Grotius did not give the same answer to this question in his various works. As the right to punish is concerned, we find a theory that seems to be akin to the one of John Locke in the De iure praedae, one akin to the theories of the Spanish late-scholastics in De satisfactione and De imperio, and a theory coming close to what Thomas Hobbes had said on the ruler's right to punish in the De iure belli ac pacis.Of course, Grotius can only have been familiar with the theory of the Spanish late-scholastics, since those of Locke and Hobbes were still to be written by the time Grotius had passed away. (shrink)

Universities are occupied by Management, a regime obsessed with ‘accountability' through measurement, increased competition, efficiency, ‘excellence', and misconceived economic salvation. Given the occupation's absurd side-effects, we ask ourselves how Management has succeeded in taking over our precious universities. An alternative vision for the academic future consists of a public university, more akin to a socially engaged knowledge commons than to a corporation. We suggest some provocative measures to bring about such a university. However, as Management seems impervious to cogent (...) arguments, such changes can only happen if academics take action. Hence, we explore several strategies for a renewed university politics. (shrink)

Since the first volume appeared in 2005, the collection Controversies has brought together pieces of work related to the field of argumentation, giving particular attention to those that are concerned with theoretical and practical problems connected with discursive controversy and confrontation. Authors such as P. Barrotta, M. Dascal, S. Frogel, H. Chang and D. Walton had already either edited or written previous editions to the present volume (volume six) of the collection. F. H. van Eemeren and B. Garssen (the former (...) has already, with P. Houtlosser, edited the second volume of this collection) are responsible for compiling and editing this collection. In this volume Van Eemeren and Garssen edit works they conceive as being akin to those elements which, in argumentation discourse, serve to resolve – or often to present – differences of opinion. However, it should be added that this is not a mere editing job, but rather the result of an intellectual collaboration between two international research groups dedicated to a common field – consisting, on the one hand, of controversies and, on the other, of argumentation. (shrink)

The arrival of James Van Cleve’s Problems from Reid is somewhat akin to the experience of waiting ages for a bus only for several to arrive at the same time. It is a gargantuan book, weighing in at over 550 pages covering sixteen chapters and a remarkable twenty-six appendices.There have been several important single-author books on Reid in the last decade or so, from the likes of Gideon Yaffe and Ryan Nichols, and some impressive anthologies, such as those edited (...) by Patrick Rysiew, and by Todd Buras and Rebecca Copenhaver (Thomas Reid on... (shrink)

This article focuses on the interpretative complexities encountered in the work of Lidwien van de Ven. First, it aims to map out the always porous nature of the relationships between aesthetics, politics and religion that make up her palimpsest-like images. Second, it aims to tease out a three-part analytics of photography. Third, it attempts to flesh out a difficult notion of spectacle that is inherent to her wide-ranging practice, and which distinguishes her project from liberal photojournalism with its obeisance to (...) identity politics and its weak notion of ethics. Finally, it aims to isolate, within the dialectical machinery of spectacle that is so often put to work by western democracies, a pragmatic moment in our encounter with her photographs that has real political purchase. With a variable notion of close reading at the crux of the operation, the article probes the efficacy of this moment so akin to philosophical aesthetics. (shrink)

In seinem Werk „Totalität und Unendlichkeit” ist Levinas darauf bedacht, eine radikale Philosophie der Transzendenz zu konzipieren. Seine Kritik der abendländischen philosophischen Tradition gipfelt in dem Vorwurf, dasz sie die Momente der Reflexion, der Immanenz und der Totalität übermäszig betont hat, und zwar auf Kosten der echten Transzendenz. Sie opfert die Andersheit des Anderen auf, um ihn systematisch auf Denselben zurückzuführen. Das wirklich Transzendente kann wesensmäszig nicht innerhalb des Horizontes einer Vorvertrautheit erscheinen, da es „totaliter aliter” und das von mir (...) vollkommen Getrennte ist. Es tritt mir im Antlitz des Anderen entgegen. Das Antlitz empfängt seinen Sinn nicht von etwas anderem, es ist selbst sinnverleihend. Infolge des Antlitzes existiere ich für den Anderen, habe ich die Möglichkeit, mich ihm gegenüber sittlich zu verhalten. Transzendenz wird daher ursprünglich im sittlichen Bewusztsein erfahren. Sittlichkeit offenbart sich als Widerstand gegen die immer anwesende Versuchung, den Anderen zu negieren. Das Gebot „Du sollst nicht töten !” ist die erste, nicht die letzte Sinngebung. Dadurch - und nicht durch blosze Erkenntnis — wird das Seiende als Seiendes bestätigt. Das Tötungsverbot ist jedoch der Kristallisationspunkt für alle anderen ethischen Normen. Die Person, die ich nicht beseitigen darf, musz ich auch achten, ihrer Schamhaftigkeit darf ich keine Gewalt antun, für sie bin ich verantwortlich. Auf der sittlichen Anerkennung des Anderen beruht die intersubjektive Verständigung, die Sprache, der vernünftige Umgang und dessen Institutionalisierung. Daher das Primat der praktischen Vernunft, das Levinas auf eine neue Weise zu begründen sucht. Die soeben skizzierte „Philosophie des Antlitzes” bildet den Inhalt der drei ersten Kapitel des Werkes „Totalität und Unendlichkeit”. Das vierte und letzte Kapitel trägt jedoch den bezeichnenden Titel „Jenseits des Antlitzes”. Hierin entwirft Levinas auf überraschende Weise eine Philosophie der Erotik und der Fruchtbarkeit. Was motiviert ihn zu dieser Wendung ? Ausgangspunkt der gesamten Problematik ist zweifellos die Frage nach dem Urteil Gottes, durch das meine Existenz gerechtfertigt oder verworfen wird. Ohne solch ein Urteil wäre Sittlichkeit lediglich subjektive Illusion oder Wahnsinn. Wie kann es aber gefällt werden ? Levinas weist alle theologischen und philosophischen Lösungsversuche ab. Das Urteil Gottes ist kein übernatürlicher Eingriff in das mundane Geschehen ; es tritt nicht, wie Hegel geglaubt hat, im Laufe der Weltgeschichte zutage ; es offenbart sich nicht in der Innerlichkeit einer der Mystik beflissenen Seele. Levinas zufolge bedarf das göttliche Urteil, um als Wahrheit hervortreten zu können, einer unendlichen Zeit. Diese ist ihrerseits nur denkbar infolge der menschlichen Generativität. Warum vertieft sich Levinas jedoch in eine Phänomenologie der Erotik ? Die Erotik ist das Gebiet des Zweideutigen. In ihr verschmelzen Immanenz und Transzendenz, sinnliches Bedürfnis und metaphysisches Verlangen. Das Weibliche erscheint einerseits als das Verletzliche, andererseits als das schamlos Herausfordernde. Die erotische Liebkosung möchte etwas ausdrücken, es gelingt ihr aber nicht, es zur Sprache zu bringen. Während die Philosophie des Antlitzes die Tagesansicht der menschlichen Existenz zeigt — Sittlichkeit, Verantwortung, Sprache, Vernunft — offenbart die Phänomenologie der Erotik deren Nachtseite. Levinas weist alle Versuche vorschneller Rationalisierung des erotischen Geschehens — die psychoanalytische, die Sartre'sche, die sozialpsychologische — zurück. Die sinnliche Liebe ist und bleibt, anthropologisch betrachtet, zweideutig. Ihre Ambiguität wird ausschlieszlich durch die Fruchtbarkeit überstiegen. Das Kind ist der geheime Sinn der Erotik, ohne dasz die Liebenden dies ahnen. — Levinas distanziert sich hier bewuszt von den „existenziellen” Phänomenologen, von Sartre und Merleau-Ponty. Ihnen zufolge ist der Mensch das „lumen naturale” ; d.h. dasz das Sinnvolle ausschlieszlich auf Grund von menschlicher Intentionalität geschieht. Levinas dagegen beweist, dasz das eminent Sinnvolle sich hinter dem Rücken des ego abspielt, dasz es durch kein cogito erkannt, erstrebt, entworfen wird. — Ueberdies wird durch die Einführung des Begriffes „Fruchtbarkeit” der Zauberkreis der phänomenologischen Immanenz gesprengt. Das erotische Abenteuer hat zwar seinen Ursprung in Mir, sein Endpunkt befindet sich jedoch auszer Mir. Die Subjektivität ist zwar unendliche Intersubjektivität, wie Husserl bereits erkannt hat, sie ist es aber lediglich infolge ihrer Generati vi tat. Sie ist m.a.W. dadurch unendlich, dasz sie sich immer aufs neue verjüngt. Die alte Generation stirbt ab und macht einer Jugend Platz, die radikal von neuem zu beginnen imstande ist. Levinas konzipiert nicht nur eine Philosophie der Jugend, er meditiert auch über das Wesen der Vaterschaft. Die Vaterschaft befreit das Ich von der Bürde seiner Selbstheit, denn das Ich ist der Sohn. Der Sohn bedeutet in Bezug auf den Vater einerseits einen „ Bruch" — und somit Diskontinuität — andererseits „Hilfsbedürftigkeit” — und daher Kontinuität. Die Intersubjektivität erhält sich somit als eine Kontinuität, die immer wieder unterbrochen wird. — Ein anderes wichtiges ethischreligiöses Denkmotiv ist das folgende : Jeder Sohn ist einziger Sohn. Er verdankt seine Unizität jedoch nicht irgendwelchen leiblich-seelischen Eigenschaften. Er ist einzig, weil der Vater ihn auf einzigartige Weise liebt. Infolgedessen ist jeder Sohn auch auserwählter Sohn. Er ist aber dazu bestimmt, zusammen mit anderen Auserwählten zu existieren. Hieraus entspringt die Idee der menschlichen Bruderschaft und der menschlichen Solidarität. Sie bilden die Grundlage jeglicher Gemeinschaftsbildung und jedweder sozialen Normierung. Die menschliche Sozialität ist, Levinas betont dies, kein tête-à-tête eines Ich mit einem Du ; sie schlieszt notwendigerweise die Möglichkeit eines Dritten in sich. Die menschlichen Gruppen und Gemeinschaften — auch die der Familie — sind von hier aus aufs neue philosophisch zu deuten. Ein Schlüssel zum Verständniss der Levinas'schen Metaphysik ist sein Begriff der „Infinitisierung” („infinition”), dessen Inhalt vielleicht mit der Wendung „dem Unendlichen entgegen wachsen” angedeutet werden kann. Mit welchem Recht spricht jedoch unser Philosoph von solch einem Wachsen, da er doch überzeugt ist, dasz der Mensch gänzlich — nach Leib und Seele — sterblich ist ? Im Geiste Levinas' musz man jedoch sagen, dasz gerade jene Sterblichkeit die „Infinitisierung” ermöglicht. Der Vater musz vollständig sterben, damit das Intervall zwischen den Generationen entsteht, das für die Erneuerung und Verjüngung der Intersubjektivität erforderlich ist. Auf diese Weise kann eine gänzlich neue Zeit anbrechen : die Zeit des Sohnes. Levinas' höchst originelle Philosophie der Zeitlichkeit kann am besten im Ausgang von Martin Heidegger — der hier ausschlieszlich als der Verfasser von „Sein und Zeit” zur Sprache kommt — belichtet werden. Beiden Denkern ist die Ueberzeugung eigen, dasz Temporalität unlöslich verbunden ist mit der — wie immer aufgefaszten — menschlichen Subjektivität. Levinas lehnt jedoch die Lehre von den temporalen Ekstasen, der endlichen Zukunft und dem Sein zum Tode leidenschaftlich ab. Das jemeinige Dasein stirbt zwar notwendigerweise und vollständig. Der Begriff der Subjektivität deckt sich jedoch nicht mit dem des individuellen Daseins. Subjektivität ist vielmehr generative Intersubjektivität. Als solche hat sie eine unendliche Zukunft vor sich. Der Gegensatz Heidegger-Levinas geht letztlich auf eine Verschiedenheit der ethischen Sicht zurück. (Levinas glaubt die Philosophie von „Sein und Zeit” als Ausdruck eines bestimmten Ethos verstehen zu müssen.) Heidegger zufolge ist das Dasein je seine Möglichkeit. Existierend kann es die Möglichkeit, die es ist, verwirklichen oder auch verfehlen : beides ist definitiv. Die Geschichte des individuellen Daseins nimmt auf diese Weise den Charakter eines unwiderruflichen Schicksals an. Dies gibt Levinas Anlasz zu grundsätzlichen Bedenken. Die Transzendenz, die Heidegger dem Dasein zuschreibt, ist keine echte Transzendenz, da sie auf die Gewinnung der je eigenen Möglichkeit gerichtet ist. Dies führt zu einer egozentrischen Selbstvergötterung und Vereinsamung. Das Ethos, das jene Philosophie des Daseins beseelt, ist das eines tragischen Heldentums. Dem stellt Levinas sein eigenes Ideal der spontanen Verantwortlichkeit, Dienstbarkeit und Geduld gegenüber. — Aber auch die Vorstellung einer endlichen Existenz, deren Verfehlungen und Versäumnisse schicksalhafte Endgültigkeit besitzen, ist unvereinbar mit der religiösen Sicht unseres Philosophen. Seiner Ansicht nach enthält der Begriff des endlichen Daseins einen impliziten Hinweis, dem nachzugehen ist. Levinas tut dies mit Hilfe der Begriffe „Jugend”, „radikale Erneuerung” und „Diskontinuität der Zeit”. Es ist völlig wahr, was Heidegger behauptet : Sein erscheint als Zeit, aber wohlgemerkt, als unendliche Zeit. Sie erstreckt sich durch die verschiedenen Zeiten und durch die Intervalle, die die Zeit des Vaters von der des Sohnes scheiden. Darum ist es undenkbar, dasz der eine Augenblick bruchlos aus der Ekstase des anderen hervorgeht. „Der Augenblick findet, während er fortdauert, den Tod und ersteht wieder. Tod und Auferstehung konstituieren die Zeit. Aber eine derartige formale Struktur setzt die Beziehung von Mir zum Anderen voraus und als deren Boden die Fruchtbarkeit.” Levinas' Philosophie ist nicht „optimistisch”. Von Anfang an betont er, dasz der Realist eigentlich anerkennen müszte, dasz das Wesen der Wirklichkeit der Krieg ist. Vom Frieden könne nur in der Sprache einer Eschatologie geredet werden. — Die Frage drängt sich nun auf, ob jenes Eschaton im Geiste von Levinas im Zusammenhang mit dem „Urteil Gottes” steht. Sie kann unter dem Vorbehalt bejaht werden, dasz dabei alle Vorstellungen, die dem Glauben — auch dem jüdischen Glauben — entstammen, ausgeklammert werden. Es handelt sich bei Levinas um eine Religiosität „innerhalb der Grenzen der reinen Vernunft.” Das Eschaton ist unserem Philosophen zufolge nicht ein welterschütterndes Ereignis ; es unterbricht nicht den Verlauf der kosmischen und sozialen Prozesse ; es ist auch nicht „das Ende der Zeiten”. Das Eschaton ist nichts anderes als das Offenbar-werden des göttlichen Urteils oder, was dasselbe besagt ein Sprechen, durch das die Wahrheit und die Güte in Erscheinung tritt. Voraussetzung dafür ist eine „Konvergenz der Moralität und der Realität” ; d.h. dasz im Laufe einer unendlichen Zukunft das innerliche Leben der Menschheit vertieft, ihr Gewissen empfindlicher und ihre Geduld gröszer geworden sein wird. Denn jenes Sprechen erfolgt nicht mit Posaunenschall am „Jüngsten Tag”, es ereignet sich vielmehr alle Tage in den Beziehungen von Person zu Person. M.a.W. das Urteil Gottes wird immerwährend gefällt, wenn auch hinter den Kulissen der offiziellen Geschichte. Es wird gefällt, wenn der Erniedrigte und Beleidigte mich beschuldigt — beschuldigt einfach dadurch, dasz er mir in die Augen schaut. Das Antlitz des Anderen lädt mich vor Gericht, vor Ihm musz ich mich verantworten, Ich, in meiner persönlichen Einzigkeit und Unersetzlichkeit. Meinerseits unterwerfe Ich mich dem Gerichte Gottes in dem Masze, als Ich bereit bin, jene Anklage gegen mich zu vernehmen und mich zu verantworten. Wohlgemerkt : Levinas hält daran fest, dasz das eschatologische Urteil das Werk Gottes ist ; es wird jedoch ausschlieszlich in Menschen und durch Menschen zu einer Erfahrung. Levinas’ Ueberzeugung hinsichtlich der zunehmenden Empfindlichkeit des menschheitlichen Gewissens beruht nicht auf einem oberflächlichen Fortschrittsglauben. Ihr liegt vielmehr eine metaphysische Sicht zugrunde. Den Schlüssel zu ihrem Verständnis bietet wiederum der Begriff der „Infinitisierung”. Sie macht sich in analoger Weise auf drei verschiedenen Ebenen geltend. -Die erste ist die der Fruchtbarkeit. Rein empirisch kann man feststellen, dasz das fruchtbare Wesen andere Wesen hervorbringt, die ihrerseits fruchtbar sind, und dasz auf diese Weise die Fruchtbarkeit in der Natur zunimmt. Hinter dieser empirischen Aussage verbirgt sich jedoch eine ethisch-metaphysische Wahrheit. Im Geiste Levinas' müszte man sagen : Kreative Güte bringt nicht nur Güte hervor, sondern überdies noch mehr Güte. Hier liegt eine Analogie mit dem vor, was soeben als das göttliche Urteil bezeichnet wurde. Durch das Urteil, das der Verfolgte und Unterdrückte über mich fällt, wird mein schlummerndes Gewissen geweckt. Diese Weckung wird ihrerseits eine bleibende gewissensvollere Haltung zur Folge haben. Ich werde jetzt andere Anklagen eher vernehmen und mich ihnen bereitwilliger stellen. Es ist hier wieder die Rede von einer „Infinitisierung”, d.h. von einem unendlichen Wachstum in der Richtung auf das Gute zu. Das dritte und höchste Niveau ist das des metaphysischer Verlangens („ Désir"). Dieses unterscheidet sich wesentlich von dem egozentrischen Bedürfnis („ besoin"). Was letzteres betrifft, gilt das Folgende : Hat sich das Ich seines Objektes bemächtigt — hat es dieses theoretisch erkannt oder praktisch in Besitz genommen —, dann ist das Bedürfnis gestillt. Es ist erloschen, wenn das Andere, das Objekt, Mir, Demselben, einverleibt wurde. Daraus wird die grundsätzliche Endlichkeit jenes egozentrischen Lebens ersichtlich. Das metaphysische Verlangen dagegen ist unersättlich, „nicht, weil es einem unendlichen Hunger entspricht, sondern weil es keine Speise begehrt”. Es ist ja auf kein Objekt gerichtet. Dem Unendlichen gegenüber ist kein intentionales Verhalten möglich. Wohl aber ist es denkbar, dasz das endliche Wesen von dem überwältigenden Charakter des Unendlichen getroffen wird. Je mehr mein Verständnis für jenes alles Uebertreffende zunimmt, desto gröszer wird auch mein metaphysisches Verlangen. Es liegt also wieder eine „Infinitisierung” vor. Das Eschaton ereignet sich demnach jetzt und hier, wenn auch die offizielle Geschichte von ihm nichts weisz. Es besteht in einem unmerklichen Reifen der Menschheit, die sich in einer unendlichen Zukunft einem gänzlich neuen ethischsozialen Zustand nähert. Der eschatalogische Endzustand kann vielleicht als die vollkommene Harmonie zwischen Sozialität und Personalität charakterisiert werden. (shrink)

Van Leeuwen’s Religion as Make-Believe, A Theory of Belief, Imagination, and Group Identity argues that religious and political beliefs are fundamentally different from mundane, factual beliefs and represent a cognitive attitude more akin to imagining. To ground this difference, Van Leeuwen proposes four principles defining factual beliefs: ‘involuntariness’ mandates that people cannot choose what they believe; ‘no compartmentalization’ says that factual – but not religious – beliefs guide behavior in all domains; ‘cognitive governance’ requires that inferences be readily drawn (...) from factual beliefs; ‘evidential vulnerability' entails that beliefs are revised given contradictory evidence. While factual beliefs are supposed to meet these standards, Van Leeuwen marshals evidence that religious and tribal beliefs – or “credences” – fail to obey these four principles. In this commentary, I argue that beliefs – both factual and religious – are often much more complicated than Van Leeuwen assumes. This complexity makes perfect conformity to the four principles unlikely, even for factual beliefs. I review Van Leeuwen’s evidence for credences and suggest that this evidence is compatible with the null hypothesis: that religious beliefs are simply beliefs. (shrink)

The idea that a serious threat to scientific realism comes from unconceived alternatives has been proposed by van Fraassen, Sklar, Stanford and Wray among others. Peter Lipton's critique of this threat from underconsideration is examined briefly in terms of its logic and its applicability to the case of space-time and particle physics. The example of space-time and particle physics indicates a generic heuristic for quantitative sciences for constructing potentially serious cases of underdetermination, involving one-parameter family of rivals T_m that work (...) as a team rather than as a single rival against default theory T_0. In important examples this new parameter has a physical meaning and makes a crucial _conceptual_ difference, shrinking the symmetry group and in some case putting gauge freedom, formal indeterminism vs. determinism, the presence of the hole argument, etc., at risk. Methodologies akin to eliminative induction or tempered subjective Bayesianism are more demonstrably reliable than the custom of attending only to "our best theory": they can lead either to a serious rivalry or to improved arguments for the favorite theory. The example of General Relativity vs. massive spin 2 gravity, a recent topic in the physics literature, is discussed. Arguably the General Relativity and philosophy literatures have ignored the most serious rival to General Relativity. (shrink)

This study, the third in a series of three, draws on a broader Norwegian research project exploring the phenomenon of support for young persons with mental health issues. The aim was to explore and explicate the sense of “nourishing communion”, as a somewhat neglected aspect of support. Fourteen Norwegian young adults, aged 18-25, were interviewed about their experiences of support. Data was analyzed using van Manen’s hermeneutic-phenomenological approach to open up possible meanings of how nourishing communion is concretely lived. Analysis (...) was supplemented by in-depth reflexive dialogues between the first and second author, which fostered a nourishing communion akin to the processes and dimensions of our phenomenon of interest. Findings highlight five intertwined existential themes: a) trusting the other to hold vulnerability safely; b) flourishing in mutual participation; c) acceptance in a felt togetherness; d) feeling found and received; and e) feeling an attuned resonance. The notion of “nourishing communion” as a significant but neglected element of support challenges current practice, suggesting the need for a different approach to collaboration with young persons and their networks. From the perspectives both of individual professional engagement and of policy making, there is a need for further exploration of how young persons might be supported to create and maintain a broader range of nourishing relationships. (shrink)

We critically evaluate arguments in a recent Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics article by Svoboda, Adler, and Van Howe disputing the 2012 affirmative infant male circumcision policy recommendations of the American Academy of Pediatrics. We provide detailed evidence in explaining why the extensive claims by these opponents are not supported by the current strong scientific evidence. We furthermore show why their legal and ethical arguments are contradicted by a reasonable interpretation of current U.S. and international law and ethics. After (...) all considerations are taken into account it would be logical to conclude that failure to recommend male circumcision early in infancy may be viewed as akin to failure to recommend childhood vaccination to parents. In each case, parental consent is required and the intervention is not compulsory. Our evaluation leads us to dismiss the arguments by Svoboda et al. Instead, based on the evidence, infant male circumcision is both ethical and lawful. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:15 LOCKE, HUME AND THE NATURE OF VOLITIONS 1. The concept of a volition plays a key role in the theories of mind that both Locke and Hume devise. It is central to the views each develops on the nature of action and of explanations of actions, on the character of practical reasoning, on the nature of desire, on the ways in which, most usefully, to categorize the several (...) kinds of mental states and events. Without attending closely to their concepts of volition, one cannot get quite clear about the views of each, and the considerations thought to support those views, on the vexed questions of free action and of responsibility. Whether it be Locke or Hume, then, there is good reason to scrutinize what he says of volitions. Why take them together? The principal reason is that the views of each, when considered closely, throw a quite considerable light on those of the other (or so I hope to show). But there is a philosophical point as well. A theory of volitions more adequate than either proposes must borrow from each. What is amenable to being borrowed, and what ought to be borrowed, are fairly readily seen when the two theories are put face to face. I concentrate on three central issues: the question whether volitions are thoughts; the relationship of volition to practical reasoning; the links between volitions and their effects. Hume's views on these topics are to be found chiefly in the Treatise and the first Enquiry; Locke's, of course, in the Essay. Locke's recently published correspondence with the Dutch theologian Philippus van Limborch is, however, essential reading here, and I have made extensive use of it. 16 2. Locke and Hume agree that volitions are indefinable psychological primitives that must be invoked in an analysis of voluntary action (T 399, EHU 69, E 249). They agree, too, in a number of the things that each says in his efforts to characterize volitions. They differ, however, on a fundamental point, Hume's volitions are 'internal impression[s]' (T 399); Locke's are 'thought[s] of the Mind' (E 235). As internal impressions Humean volitions are feelings akin to, but not 'properly speaking' (T 399) instances of, passions. They are like the 'direct passions' (desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear) in two respects: they are 'immediate effects of pain and pleasure' (T 399); they are 'propense and averse motions of the mind' (T 574), and thus bear a special relation to action. Though they are not thoughts they have causal, thus contingent, links to thoughts, including in particular thoughts whose content specify the so-called 'immediate object of volition' (E 66). As 'distinct impression[s]' (T 625) volitions do not modify the thoughts of their objects in the logically intimate way in which, in Hume's view, the feeling essential to belief 'modiffies] the conception' (T 625) of what is believed. Hume frequently compares volitions to commands (T 623, 629, 632; EHU 48, 64, 65, 67, 68). He also, not surprisingly, denies them truth values: because they are not capable of 'an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact' it is 'impossible... they can be pronounced either true or false' (T 458; compare T 415). Locke's volitions are thoughts, not feelings; and they have their own contents and objects. '[T]he proper and only object of the will', he writes, 'is some action of ours' (E 258); in forming a volition one 17 'wills to number', say, or 'wills to walk' (C 405). Locke never says as much, but his overall theory is best read as requiring volitions to be thoughts without truth values. He contrasts 'Will' or 'the Power of Volition1 with 'Understanding' or 'the Power of Thinking' (E 128). Since 'Volition' is as much a 'Mode... £f thinking' as is 'Reasoning' or 'Judging' (E 227), however, the contrast is most plausibly taken as one between thoughts that do and thoughts that do not purport to represent the way the world is. Locke's distinction, to be examined below, between volitions and 'last judgements of the understanding' suggests the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:META-ONTOLOGY AND META-FICTION by Denis E. B. Pollard Peter van inwagen's attempt to explain the nature of fiction makes use of Quine's program in meta-ontology.1 This program comprises four basic theses: (i) that being is the same as existence, (ii) that being is univocal, (iii) that this univocal sense is best captured, for the purposes of formalization, by die existential quantifier, and (iv) that deciding what to believe about (...) what there is comes to a decision about what theories we should accept. As the aim of formalization is explicitness, then theories should be rendered into canonicalese and their commitments identified through those sentences which are prefaced with the existential quantifier. For Inwagen, as for his mentor Quine, acceptance of theory expressed in this canonical form entails acceptance of the ontology expressed in those quantified sentences. Bringing these considerations to bear on fiction, Inwagen asks, "What are theories about fiction?" and replies that they are "theories that treat stories as having an internal structure" (p. 72). The upshot of this is that such theories contain sentences which, when formally rendered, revead commitments to fictional objects. It is further claimed that such sentences can be vehicles of objective truth. Thus Inwagen finds he cannot wholeheartedly dismiss Sarah Gamp as a nonentity. In this respect, his view contrasts with two contemporary accounts, the "reductivist" one which denies Sarah Gamp's existence and her possession of any properties whatever, and the more recent "Meinongian" view which would agree that Sarah Gamp does not exist, but would nonetheless strenuously maintain that she is a nurse, fat, old, and decidedly the worse for drink. Inwagen's Sarah is neither ofthese: pace both these positions, she exists all right, but with properties such as being a theoretical entity of criticism, being a satiric villainess, not being a woman, and not being fond of gin. Inwagen's attempt to steer what seems to be a middle course has yielded, if anything, a more counterintuitive result than either ofthe other views. What is die explanation for this? 244 Denis E. B. Pollard245 To begin with, it is important to note a distinction, which Inwagen himself accepts, between two kinds of sentences. Let us take the following elementary examples: (1) "Sarah Gamp is a nurse," and (2) "Sarah Gamp is a character in a nineteenth-century novel." With specimens like (1), Inwagen sides with the reductivist: such sentences asefalse, and are not about anything. But it is with examples like (2) that ontology becomes a real issue, since sentences of this kind belong to literary theory. Neither authors nor critics who make use of sentences of the first kind are committed to the existence of fictional entities. So far, so good. But what is it that compels such commitment in the second case? Inwagen is sceptical about reductivist analyses which seek to paraphrase such sentences in order to remove any "misleading" implications. Such paraphrases he would regard as at best "messy," and more seriously, unlikely to preserve intuitive meaning without appearing to say that there are fictional characters. Unfortunately, he brushes this aside as a "narrow technical issue" at the very point where rather more argument is needed. However, on the issue of preservation of intuitive meaning, it might well be argued that his contention is somewhat question-begging, suggesting a rather literal reading of (2) above as a straightforward predication superficially akin to (3) "McEnroe is a seeded player in this year's Wimbledon tournament." So by a strange alchemy, the expression "Sarah Gamp" in (2) is accorded a referential status denied to it in (1). It is at this point that the notion of"theoretical entity" is introduced to supply the need for a referent dictated by the Quinean program. Inwagen's Sarah Gamp, in this theoretical disguise, can now literally satisfy predicates like "... is a character in a nineteenth-century novel," but not predicates like "... is a nurse." The parallel being exploited here is that with scientific theory. An ideal gas can satisfy Boyle's Law, but cannot literally be ignited, put into containers, or have an offensive smell. But there is more than a suspicion of equivocation over the term... (shrink)

In this article a particular approach is presented to the problem of the human I. The starting-point is an 'interdisciplinary' question: I wonder whether nowadays we can - imbued as we are with post-cartesian criticism of the I - still be interested in mystical descriptions of the 'way inward', in particular those of Jan van Ruusbroec. I then try to develop a positive answer in three steps. First, it is shown that we do well now to get acquainted with Descartes' (...) original experience of I think, therefore I am. As M. Henry has pointed out, this primary intuition should be taken into account as a fundamental element of modern philosophical reflexion on the I. Secondly, we come to see that the first cartesian insight in the proper reality of the I does not lay itself bare to the usual post-cartesian criticism. The reason for that immunity is rather obvious: the main targets - that the human I is a self-founding reality, that it is a substrat-substance and requires a 'robust' dualism - do not appear in Descartes' original self-experience. These three points are being elucidated by regular flash-backs on Augustine's self-analysis: the affinity between the original cartesian intuition and the augustinian view of 'interior man' is unmistakable indeed. By so looking back on Augustine we get, in the third place, a foretaste of the 'turning inwards', inkeeren presented by Jan van Ruusbroec. Of course, there are quite some differences between the inner exploration of the Latin thinker and the Flemish mystic's 'introversion' - caused by the divine 'touch', gherinen in his 'ground' - but that does not alter the fact of their being akin on those points that today embarrass us most. If then we allow ourselves to take some distance from the cartesianism we are acquainted with, Ruusbroec may well - and even more strongly than Augustine - appear as a valuable interlocutor. Maybe this medieval mystic is at least able to question our modern questioning of the reality of the I? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:15 LOCKE, HUME AND THE NATURE OF VOLITIONS 1. The concept of a volition plays a key role in the theories of mind that both Locke and Hume devise. It is central to the views each develops on the nature of action and of explanations of actions, on the character of practical reasoning, on the nature of desire, on the ways in which, most usefully, to categorize the several (...) kinds of mental states and events. Without attending closely to their concepts of volition, one cannot get quite clear about the views of each, and the considerations thought to support those views, on the vexed questions of free action and of responsibility. Whether it be Locke or Hume, then, there is good reason to scrutinize what he says of volitions. Why take them together? The principal reason is that the views of each, when considered closely, throw a quite considerable light on those of the other (or so I hope to show). But there is a philosophical point as well. A theory of volitions more adequate than either proposes must borrow from each. What is amenable to being borrowed, and what ought to be borrowed, are fairly readily seen when the two theories are put face to face. I concentrate on three central issues: the question whether volitions are thoughts; the relationship of volition to practical reasoning; the links between volitions and their effects. Hume's views on these topics are to be found chiefly in the Treatise and the first Enquiry; Locke's, of course, in the Essay. Locke's recently published correspondence with the Dutch theologian Philippus van Limborch is, however, essential reading here, and I have made extensive use of it. 16 2. Locke and Hume agree that volitions are indefinable psychological primitives that must be invoked in an analysis of voluntary action (T 399, EHU 69, E 249). They agree, too, in a number of the things that each says in his efforts to characterize volitions. They differ, however, on a fundamental point, Hume's volitions are 'internal impression[s]' (T 399); Locke's are 'thought[s] of the Mind' (E 235). As internal impressions Humean volitions are feelings akin to, but not 'properly speaking' (T 399) instances of, passions. They are like the 'direct passions' (desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear) in two respects: they are 'immediate effects of pain and pleasure' (T 399); they are 'propense and averse motions of the mind' (T 574), and thus bear a special relation to action. Though they are not thoughts they have causal, thus contingent, links to thoughts, including in particular thoughts whose content specify the so-called 'immediate object of volition' (E 66). As 'distinct impression[s]' (T 625) volitions do not modify the thoughts of their objects in the logically intimate way in which, in Hume's view, the feeling essential to belief 'modiffies] the conception' (T 625) of what is believed. Hume frequently compares volitions to commands (T 623, 629, 632; EHU 48, 64, 65, 67, 68). He also, not surprisingly, denies them truth values: because they are not capable of 'an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact' it is 'impossible... they can be pronounced either true or false' (T 458; compare T 415). Locke's volitions are thoughts, not feelings; and they have their own contents and objects. '[T]he proper and only object of the will', he writes, 'is some action of ours' (E 258); in forming a volition one 17 'wills to number', say, or 'wills to walk' (C 405). Locke never says as much, but his overall theory is best read as requiring volitions to be thoughts without truth values. He contrasts 'Will' or 'the Power of Volition1 with 'Understanding' or 'the Power of Thinking' (E 128). Since 'Volition' is as much a 'Mode... £f thinking' as is 'Reasoning' or 'Judging' (E 227), however, the contrast is most plausibly taken as one between thoughts that do and thoughts that do not purport to represent the way the world is. Locke's distinction, to be examined below, between volitions and 'last judgements of the understanding' suggests the... (shrink)

Slow euthanasia or a good palliative intervention?There are many ways in which doctors influence the circumstances and/or the timing of a patient’s death. Some of these are accepted as normal medical practice—for instance, when a disproportional treatment is forgone, others are considered tolerable only under strict conditions or even intolerable, such as non-voluntary active euthanasia. A relatively new phenomenon in the ethical discussion on end-of-life decisions is terminal sedation. Terminal sedation is used in patients with terminal illnesses where normal medical (...) treatments cannot relieve severe symptoms such as pain and agitation, and no option is left but to take away the perception of these symptoms. Often, the decision to start terminal sedation is accompanied by the decision to forgo the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration in these patients. In The Netherlands, terminal sedation was estimated to be applied in 4–10% of all deaths in 2001.1 The combination of these two decisions have made the moral status of terminal sedation the subject of fierce ethical debates. Is it slow euthanasia2,3 or is it a good palliative intervention that should be sharply distinguished from euthanasia?4,5 One of the characteristics of this debate is that it is a very confused one: people disagree about the meaning of the term, the appropriateness of it and, of course, about the conditions under which it would be morally justified. As a matter of fact, these three discussions are deeply connected: as is often the case, a discussion about terms is a discussion about norms in disguise.The first observation to be made is that many seemingly descriptive definitions of terminal sedation contain normative claims. Examples of this are definitions of terminal sedation in which only …. (shrink)

In this article, we develop a bimodal perspective on possibility semantics, a framework allowing partiality of states that provides an alternative modelling for classical propositional and modal logics. In particular, we define a full and faithful translation of the basic modal logic K over possibility models into a bimodal logic of partial functions over partial orders, and we show how to modulate this analysis by varying across logics and model classes that have independent topological motivations. This relates the two realms (...) under comparison both semantically and syntactically at the level of derivations. Moreover, our analysis clarifies the interplay between the complexity of translations and axiomatizations of the corresponding logics: adding axioms to the target bimodal logic simplifies translations, or vice versa, complex translations can simplify frame conditions. We also investigate a transfer of first-order correspondence theory between possibility semantics and its bimodal counterpart. Finally, we discuss the conceptual trade-off between giving translations and giving new semantics for logical systems, and we identify a number of further research directions to which our analysis gives rise. (shrink)